The Uncertain Trumpet: Disaster Communications and the Law by Randle, Russell V. & Reinhardt, Jeffery
Seattle University School of Law 
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Seattle University Law Review SUpra Student Publications and Programs 
2014 
The Uncertain Trumpet: Disaster Communications and the Law 
Russell V. Randle 
Jeffery Reinhardt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr_supra 
 Part of the Disaster Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Russell V. Randle & Jeffery Reinhardt, The Uncertain Trumpet: Disaster Communications and the Law, 37 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA 11 (2014). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle University Law Review 
SUpra by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. 
Seattle University School of Law 
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Seattle University Law Review SUpra Student Publications and Programs 
2014 
The Uncertain Trumpet: Disaster Communications and the Law 
Russell V. Randle 
Jeffery Reinhardt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr_supra 
 Part of the Disaster Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Russell V. Randle & Jeffery Reinhardt, The Uncertain Trumpet: Disaster Communications and the Law, 37 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA 1 (2014). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle University Law Review 
SUpra by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. 
11 
The Uncertain Trumpet:      
Disaster Communications and the Law 
Russell V. Randle & Jeffrey Reinhardt* 
For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare him-
self to the battle? 
– I Cor. 14:8 (KJV)
INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, Jeff Reinhardt presents practical insights on disaster 
communications and public information from the perspective of an elect-
ed official, an FCC licensed Amateur Radio (ham) operator, and a public 
affairs leader at a public utility that helps respond to wildfires and earth-
quakes. 
Working from Reinhardt’s insights, Russ Randle, an attorney who 
has advised on many environmental cleanups and oil spill response plan-
ning, outlines key legal issues with such communications, information, 
and learning, all three of which are essential to effective disaster re-
sponse and public safety. Put simply, the most important legal issue fac-
ing disaster response and civil defense may be the need to assure by law 
that necessary steps are taken to ensure the survival and function of key 
communications systems during disasters. 
Clifford Villa’s article, Law and Lawyers in the Incident Command 
System, opened an important discussion about disaster responses and the 
roles lawyers can and do play in such efforts.
1
 Villa focused insightfully 
* Russ Randle is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Patton Boggs LLP, where he has prac-
ticed environmental law since 1981. He is author of the Environmental Law Institute’s Oil Pollution 
Deskbook (2012). Jeff Reinhardt is a public information and communications professional for a 
public utility. He has also served in a number of emergency response volunteer roles as a founding 
member of the Agoura Hills Disaster Response Team (now a Community Emergency Response 
Team, or “CERT”), the L.A. County Sheriff’s Disaster Communications Service, and as a ham radio 
communications volunteer. He served two terms on the Agoura Hills City Council, including a term
as mayor of Agoura Hills. He has emergency response experience that includes wildfires in the 
Malibu area and several earthquakes, including Northridge. Earlier in his career, he was a TV news
reporter during a historic blizzard in Buffalo, N.Y. in 1977.
1. Clifford Villa, Law and Lawyers in the Incident Command System, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1855 (2013). 
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on the role of lawyers in the Incident Command System (ICS). That sys-
tem evolved, beginning from the late-1960s on, to help govern and ra-
tionalize disaster response work in the United States, addressing disasters 
ranging from California wildfires, to hurricanes, to terrorist attacks.
2
 
By contrast, this Article focuses on disaster communications, pre-
paredness, and response issues for attorneys representing parties—public 
and private—who face hard disaster response issues but who are not in 
overall command. These issues, while predictably arising in emergen-
cies, also arise in unexpected sectors, such as the need for financial ser-
vice companies to have working business continuity plans to address dis-
ruptions from a disaster like the September 11th terrorist attacks. 
Attorneys play a vital but little recognized role in helping clients 
prepare for and cope with disasters, especially in assuring proper fore-
thought and preparation as a routine, essential part of business planning 
and practice in virtually every sector of the economy. At issue is the co-
ordination of response entities that infrequently work together and must 
do so on short notice under stress to provide immediate protection for life 
and property, and to manage recovery efforts extending beyond the ini-
tial event. 
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS: PRACTICAL LESSONS 
As Villa outlined in his article, the ICS structure has evolved as a 
flexible mechanism to “right-size” the response to an emergency situa-
tion, which is best defined as an “Unusual Occurrence” (UO) that poses 
an imminent threat to life or property.
3
 However, too much ICS structural 
response adds complexity, increasing the danger of a failed communica-
tion or mission, while too little means that the response mechanisms can 
be quickly overwhelmed. 
Providing adequate communication and timely, accurate infor-
mation to responders and the public are essential elements in almost eve-
ry effective disaster response, whether natural (e.g., hurricanes or earth-
quakes) or man-made (e.g., terrorist attacks or oil spills). 
Perhaps the most critical element is establishing, maintaining, and 
re-establishing communications resources as needed. Without a solid 
communications base, the response mechanisms are extremely limited. 
Put another way, they can only be as effective as their communications 
2. Id. at 1861–95 
3. Id. at 1861–75. “UO” is a term used by first responders for larger emergencies. For example,
a holdup at the local convenience mart is not a UO; a bank holdup with hostages might be. Certainly 
hurricanes, earthquakes, and wildfires are UOs. 
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allow. As communications systems have grown more complex, they ap-
pear to have become more vulnerable and compartmentalized. 
Thirty years ago, emergency communications relied upon wire lines 
and analog radio systems. Today’s systems include the internet; voice 
and data conveyed through wire, cable TV systems, fiber-optic cable, 
radio links, and cellular telephones; and a mixture of analog and digital 
radio systems—the latter of which are often incompatible with one an-
other. 
This compatibility issue manifested itself in New York during the 
September 11th  attacks, and it is still not fully resolved.
4
 Both the prolif-
eration of digital communications systems using proprietary formats and 
the easy ability of response agencies to encrypt their digital communica-
tions have created a patchwork of incompatible radio systems. Adjoining 
agencies may now be unable to communicate with one another, where in 
the past they could. In some regions work-arounds are being implement-
ed, but at considerable costs.
5
 Moreover, there is now an additional link 
that can malfunction at a time when it is needed most. 
The September 11th terrorist attacks destroyed broadcast towers for 
a number of television and radio outlets and greatly complicated the dis-
semination of information as a result. Following Hurricane Katrina, radio 
communications for New Orleans were decimated. After that debacle, 
the government stockpiled extra radios, but these were of little help be-
cause the radios were stored in a facility that flooded in a subsequent 
smaller storm.
6
 
As discussed below, the cellular telephone system has also been re-
peatedly shown to be fragile, with inadequate “surge” capacity to ac-
commodate the rapid increase in calls arising in an emergency.
7
 Such 
4. See Edward Wyatt, 9 Years After 9/11, Public Safety Radios Not Ready, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/business/07rescue.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
5. See David Boyd, Emergency Responders Need Equipment Comptaibility, DHS Official Says, 
DIGITAL COMMUNITIES (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Emergency-
Responders-Need-Equipment-Compatibility-DHS.html. 
6. JEFFREY A. SCHWARTZ & DAVID WEBB, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND THE 
LOUISIANA DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS 14 (2006). “Without exception, every 
facility, division or key decision maker in the Department interviewed for this report identified 
communication as the biggest problem during and after the two hurricanes.” Id. 
7. Michael B. Farrell, Cellphone Networks Overwhelmed After Blasts in Boston, BOS. GLOBE
(Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/04/16/cellphone-networks-overwhelme 
d-blast-aftermath/wq7AX6AvnEemM35XTH152K/story.html; Dugald McConnell & Brian Todd, 
FCC to Investigate Cell Phone Logjam After Earthquake, CNN (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.cnn. 
com/2011/US/08/25/earthquake.cell.phones/; Aliya Sternstein, Cellphone Emergency Call Service 
Failed Following East Coast Quake, NEXTGOV (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.nextgov.com/health/ 
2011/11/cellphone-emergency-call-service-failed-following-east-coast-quake/50190/. 
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failures occurred after the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and after the 
August 2011 East Coast earthquake.
8
 
Widespread communications failures in fall 2012 during Super-
storm Sandy further show how fragile the cellular system is.
9
 Many re-
peater sites have limited battery backup power systems,
10
 or none at all, 
and are hard to connect to portable generators.
11
 Too much demand, 
which is predictable in an emergency, can overwhelm portions of the 
network.
12
 Cellular utilities have reserve resources in the form of 
“COWs” (Cellular on Wheels trailers that can be deployed), but they are 
generally part of the recovery effort, not the initial response.
13
 
During Superstorm Sandy, several Manhattan central telephone of-
fices, critical to running both the wireline and wireless telephone sys-
tems, were knocked out by flooding because critical operational equip-
ment was located in the basement or first floor, vulnerable to the storm 
surge.
14
 Moreover, many buildings in New York City were rendered un-
inhabitable for lack of electrical power because their transformers were 
located at ground level or below, and these were destroyed by the deluge, 
knocking out building electrical service for elevators, HVAC, and water 
pumps.
15
 The buildings were uninhabitable. If communications and 
emergency personnel cannot safely staff the key offices, these communi-
8. Brad Stone, Why Cell Phone Networks Fail in Emergencies, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-16/why-cell-phone-networks-fail-
in-emergencies; Judson Berger, Quake Exposes Post-9/11 Cracks in Cell Phone Coverage, Emer-
gency Response, FOX NEWS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/24/quake-
exposes-cracks-in-cell-phone-coverage-emergency-response/. 
9. Alexis Kwasinski, Lessons from Field Damage Assessments About Communications Net-
works Power Supply and Infrastructure Performance During Natural Disasters with a Focus on Hur-
ricane Sandy 2, 8 (Feb. 3, 2013) (unpublished paper), available at http://users.ece.utexas.edu/~kwasi 
nski/1569715143%20Kwasinski%20paper%20FCC-NR2013%20submitted.pdf (noting a 25% fail-
ure over ten states and almost non-existent coverage in the western Rockaway peninsula).  
10. Repeater sites take the relatively weak signals of hand-held or mobile radios and rebroad-
cast them over a wide area. They tend to be located on tall buildings, water tanks, radio towers, or 
elevated terrain such as mountains. By their nature, these locations have limited access and may be 
difficult to service in a larger emergency. “The cause of loss of service from almost all of these 
affected base stations was lack of power.” Id. at 8. 
11. “[A] majority of base stations in cities and towns in the affected area were placed on build-
ings roofs and had no permanent gensets. . . . [M]any sites did not have any way of connecting a 
generator at ground level.” Id. 
12. Cell phone demand increased by 1300% at 11 a.m. on September 11, 2001. Jennifer 
Rexroad, Lessons Learned from 9/11 Attacks, FCC WORKSHOP ON NETWORK RESILIENCY 2013, 9 
(Feb. 6, 2013), http://edas.info/web/fcc-nr2013/program.html.  
13. See Kwasinski, supra note 9, at 19. 
14. Id. at 2, 8 (emergency generators and fuel pumps flooded in first floor and basement loca-
tions). 
15. Id. 
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cations systems and other services may remain offline or function at re-
duced capacity. 
The emergency communications systems themselves are vulnerable 
as shown by the June 29, 2012 Derecho storm. That storm killed twenty-
two people, knocked out power for millions of people from Indiana to 
Delaware, and disabled at least seventeen 911 call centers in three states, 
“affecting the ability of more than 2 million residents to reach 9-1-1.”16 
The FCC reported that “9-1-1 communications were disrupted in large 
part because of avoidable planning and system failures, including inade-
quate physical diversity and lack of functional backup power in central 
offices.”17 Backup generators failed because of incorrect hookups, other 
uncorrected problems identified in prior drills, skipped generator testing, 
and because generators ran out of fuel.
18
 Backup batteries, while availa-
ble, only lasted a few hours and proved to be insufficient.
19
 These fail-
ures affected both landline and wireless telephones. 
Users are also vulnerable; a prolonged power outage leaves many 
cell phones with dead batteries unable to be recharged until commercial 
power is restored. One upshot of the cellular revolution is that many res-
idences are now eliminating wire line telephone service—a service that 
tends to be more robust when power fails.
20
 This ongoing change also 
complicates the use of “reverse 911” callouts (i.e., “robo calls”) or text 
messages that can distribute critical information on a mass scale.
21
 
16. In the Matter of Improving 9-1-1 Reliability, PS Docket No. 13-75, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, at 5 (Mar. 20, 2013). 
17. Id. at 6–7. 
18. Impact of the June 2012 Derecho on Communications Networks and Services, FED. COMM. 
COMMISSION BUREAU PUBLIC SAFETY, 15–20 (Jan. 10, 2013), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-318331A1.pdf [hereinafter FCC Derecho Report]. 
19. Id. at 17–18. 
20. Michelle V. Rafter, Cutting the Cord on a Land Line Phone, MSN MONEY (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://money.msn.com/saving-money-tips/post.aspx?post=5286b168-3a48-4b93-9793-315933feaafe; 
David Wallis, Why You Shouldn’t Drop Your Landline Just Yet, AARP (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.aarp.org/home-family/personal-technology/info-11-2013/dont-drop-your-landline.html. 
21. Virginia Tech had an emergency system that was theoretically capable of sending a text 
message to everyone on campus that there was an active shooter. However, 
[t]he protocol for sending an emergency message in use on April 16 was cumbersome, 
untimely, and problematic when a decision was needed as soon as possible. The police
did not have the capability to send an emergency alert message on their own. The police 
had to await the deliberations of the Policy Group, of which they are not a member, even
when minutes count. The Policy Group had to be convened to decide whether to send a 
message to the university community and to structure its content.
Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech: Addendum to the Report of the Review Panel, VA. TECH, 17 (Nov. 
2009), http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/prevail/docs/April16ReportRev20100106.pdf 
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In many recovery operations, the first communications often come 
from Amateur Radio (ham) operators. In instances such as the aftermath 
of Hurricane Iniki on the Hawaiian island of Kauai (1992), Hurricane 
Katrina, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and in many other emergencies, 
the ham operators got through even though more sophisticated and mod-
ern systems failed.
22
 This resiliency is due to several factors: (1) ham 
operators own and maintain their own equipment; (2) the operators are 
scattered over a wide region increasing the likelihood that enough 
equipment and enough operators will survive a disaster; (3) their equip-
ment is simple to operate and most communications are conducted using 
analog voice transmissions; and (4) some regions plan ahead and make 
use of this ancillary asset, while others choose to rely solely on their 
commercial radio systems, sometimes to their detriment.
23
 
LAWYER’S ROLE IN ENSURING EMERGENCY  
COMMUNICATIONS CAN OCCUR 
These incidents underline the legal importance of addressing com-
munications vulnerabilities, redundancy, and compatibility in advance. 
The lawyer’s role in ensuring adequate emergency communications aris-
es not just at the time of crisis, but much more frequently in routine prac-
tice, often in industries and under laws not usually associated with disas-
ter response. 
In the financial sector, for example, because of the September 11th 
attacks and the chaotic aftermath, securities dealers and many others are 
now required to have business continuity plans (BCPs) in which emer-
gency and replacement communications are key elements.
24
 According to 
a joint study by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
other regulators, 
Firms should consider the possibility of widespread lack of tele-
communications, transportation, electricity, office space, fuel[,] and 
water in their BCPs. Consideration should be given to multiple, re-
dundant services and the proximity of vendors to the potential disas-
ter area. 
22. Anne-Marie Corley, Hams in Haiti: Low-Tech Often Wins in a Disaster—But It Still Needs 
Operators, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 27, 2010), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/wireless/hams-in-haiti. 
23. Oregon Office of Emergency Management Seeking Amateur Radio Operators, OR. PUB. 
BROADCASTING (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-office-of-emergency-mana 
gement-seeking-amateur-radio-operators/. 
24. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Regulators Issue Joint Staff Review of 
Firms’ Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Planning (Aug. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539780742. 
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Remote access is an important component of business continuity 
planning. . . . Since the use of remote access relies heavily on fully 
functional telephone and internet service, firms should consider al-
ternatives to telework in their BCPs, particularly for key control 
functions such as compliance, risk management, back office opera-
tions[,] and financial and regulatory reporting.
25
Restoring communications with customers, broker dealers, and reg-
ulators is also critical. The SEC reports that “[f]irms should consider tak-
ing measure to ensure that their website is kept up-to-date with infor-
mation about the firm’s operational status and general contact infor-
mation during a disruption event.”26 Also, these communications need to 
be kept secure because of the financial sensitivity of a data breach. 
Even more important are the responsibilities assumed by a person 
who runs a school, hotel, or any business hosting large numbers of peo-
ple to ensure the safety of students, guests, and invitees.
27
 That responsi-
bility often includes a duty to warn others about dangers in the most ef-
fective manner practical.
28
 Any organization responsible for the safety of 
its patrons, whether they are students, guests, or visitors, must try to use 
current warning systems effectively or face serious tort claims by the 
victims’ families, such as those brought unsuccessfully after the 2011 
Virginia Tech shootings.
29
 
The FCC’s rulemakings and reports on the Derecho Storm, Super-
storm Sandy, and the associated failures of the 911 emergency commu-
nications systems provide a cautionary tale about the need for redundan-
cy, preparedness, training, testing, and drills to prepare for emergencies, 
not only for telecommunications providers but also for first responders.
30
 
A large number of Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs)—911 call 
25. Business Continuity Planning, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, 1, http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/offices/ocie/jointobservations-bcps08072013.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). 
26. Id. at 3. 
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 
(2011). These include common carriers, innkeepers, businesses open to the public, employers, 
schools, landlords, and those who have others in custody. Id. 
28. Id. § 18. A warning that is not communicated or is unintelligible is ineffective.
29. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 749 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 2013). In Peterson, the Virginia Supreme 
Court held that there was no special relationship that imposed a duty upon the Commonwealth of 
Virgina to warn students of criminal conduct. Id. at 308. Yet in a case involving younger children, 
where timely warnings would have clearly made a difference, it is easy to see a judgment for the 
victims’ families, particularly if the equipment and software were in place, but the school’s admin-
istration was disorganized and could not use the system effectively in an emergency, as the was the 
case at Virginia Tech. See source cited supra note 16.  
30. See FCC Derecho Report, supra note 18, at 39–43. 
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centers—were disabled by these failures, some of which were com-
pounded by failures of PSAPs to prepare adequately.
31
 
Lawyers for first responder organizations and telecommunication 
companies are not the only ones who need pay attention. Land use and 
environmental lawyers will need to help clients address these emergency 
communications vulnerabilities in future zoning and building code ap-
provals, such as operations in flood-prone areas of New York City and 
coastal New Jersey. Similarly, lawyers for cities and counties enforcing 
building codes need to ensure that critical electrical and communications 
infrastructure are placed above storm surge levels. Lawyers for internet 
and telecommunications companies need to do the same when they are 
drafting and negotiating equipment leases. Commercial real estate law-
yers also need to consider who bears the loss if a negligent building de-
sign knocks out communications and power. Insurance lawyers will need 
to address whether business interruption insurance is triggered by loss of 
communications systems, both in the emergency and in the recovery, 
which can take a long time. 
Lawyers advising public safety agencies need to help ensure that 
mobilization plans include steps to secure vulnerable communications 
links. While the choice among precautions is a practical one, the law-
yer’s role is to help her client consider and decide such issues, whether 
by sandbagging stationary equipment or by moving vulnerable but vital 
communications equipment to higher ground when flooding is an issue 
or out of likely fire-prone storage for wildfire response. 
For example, experience with the March 2011 tsunami in Japan and 
Superstorm Sandy in New York in October 2012 suggests that water-
tight doors work much better than sand bags.
32
 Water-tight doors, how-
ever, require changes in leases and building codes, among other issues 
for lawyers, and must be addressed long in advance of a problem. 
Similarly, the lawyer’s role is to make sure his client considers 
emerging problems in disaster planning, particularly communications 
problems. For example, given the proliferation of cyber-attacks,
33
 it is 
only a matter of time before a cyber-attack on emergency communica-
tions is combined with a physical terrorist attack, as enemies seek to 
31. Id. at 27–36. 
32. Kwasinski, supra note 9, at 17, 21–22. 
33. Catastrophic Cyberattack Could Hit Utilities Like PGE, SAN JOSE MERCURY (Mar. 15, 
2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_22801040/catastrophic-cyberattack-could-hit-utilities-like-
pg-e. 
2014] The Uncertain Trumpet 19 
blind and mute first responders. Lawyers need to help clients address 
cyber security requirements as they prepare for physical disasters. 
Redundant communications systems are the flip side of the vulner-
ability issue. Lawyers will need to help clients determine how much 
back-up or alternative communications capacity is warranted; most disas-
ters involve the loss of at least some communications systems, whether it 
be cellular phones, internet, or land lines. Back-ups of the same kind of 
system, as well as alternate systems, need to be part of business continui-
ty and disaster planning. Public utilities and securities trading firms need 
to address such issues as a legal requirement, with potentially serious 
financial consequences, if these obligations are missed. 
Ensuring that emergency communications systems are compatible 
is a critical element of reliable and effective emergency communications 
during a disaster.
34
 The widespread failure to have compatible emergen-
cy communications systems is not only a failure of public officials, but 
also a failure of lawyers advising these public agencies about procure-
ment matters. 
INFORMING THE PUBLIC IN A DISASTER 
A disaster of any magnitude is a media event. During and after a 
UO, the public wants to believe that their governance structure is intact 
and that emergency responders are en route with the needed resources. 
The public wants accurate reassurance that their lives and property will 
be protected, that vital services will be quickly restored (medical aid, 
food, and water), that temporary shelter will be provided if needed, and 
that they will be given a reasonable projection on how long it will take 
for meaningful recovery to occur. 
Some of the effectiveness of public outreach is proportional to the 
size of the event. The September 11th attacks in New York took out the 
transmitters of several radio and television broadcast outlets, affecting a 
region far beyond the World Trade Center site.
 
Cable, wireless, and satel-
lite video distribution filled key roles. 
Severe weather can impair the delivery of newspapers. More local-
ized events such as tornadoes pose less of a risk of debilitating media 
outlets on a large scale. The traditional forms of disseminating infor-
mation are giving way to social media, web-based outlets, and even per-
son-to-person texting. This fragmentation adds to the outreach efforts the 
34. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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response mechanism must address, particularly in guiding victims to aid 
locations and in helping to derail misinformation and false rumors. 
Regular news conferences during a response can help, but today’s 
twenty-four-hour news cycle demands a near constant flow of infor-
mation.
35
 The immediacy of competitive news agencies often sacrifices 
verification of information before it is reported; the new model of “better 
to be first” has repeatedly resulted in misinformation being distributed. 
For example, in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, individ-
uals were falsely implicated by several media outlets as possible suspects 
in the wild scramble for information afterwards.
36
 
Public Misinformation and Grand-Standing: Legal Issues 
Because disaster situations are chaotic and make communications 
difficult, those reporting can observe little without undue risk, and even 
well-run disaster responses have trouble gathering and disseminating 
accurate information in a timely way. These problems are sometimes 
compounded by self-serving or false information put forward by parties 
concerned about their potential liability, reputation, and future business. 
The classic example of such self-serving information came from 
BP’s inaccurate “low ball” estimates of the oil discharge volume from 
the Deepwater Horizon Macondo wellhead into the Gulf of Mexico.
37
 
These misguided estimates meant that critical time was wasted on un-
workable response efforts.
38
 From a legal and political standpoint, these 
erroneous estimates and the failure to control the discharge shredded 
BP’s credibility. It also left BP wide open to costly and unwise demands 
from regulators and political leaders (e.g., when the state of Louisiana 
demanded construction of barrier islands as an oil spill barrier).
39
 
In connection with the Michigan crude oil spill from the Enbridge 
pipeline, the local congressman, Mark Schauer, (D-Michigan, 7
th
 Dis-
trict) toured the spill area by helicopter on August 2, 2010, a week after 
35. Mayor Bloomberg’s post-Sandy press conferences are a good example of a well-handled 
public information effort. 
36. Boston Marathon Bombing: Rush to Break News Burns CNN, Fox News, HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/cnn-boston-marathon-bomb 
ing-mistake-441551. This source, the Hollywood Reporter, suggests that part of the problem is the 
operation of news as entertainment rather than a source of critical information to make hard deci-
sions about people’s safety. 
37. Russell V. Randle, Spills of National Significance and State Nullification, 16 OCEAN & 
COASTAL L.J. 355, 368–70 (2011). BP at first estimated 1,000 barrels a day, then 5,000, when the 
actual figure was around 60,000. Id. at 368. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 367–68. 
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the spill.
40
  The Governor of Michigan toured the area by helicopter 
twice in the four days after the spill, making statements to the press each 
time after she landed.
41
  Congressman Schauer used the Enbridge spill as 
a way to garner publicity for his re-election efforts.
42
  The Sierra Club 
used helicopter footage of the Enbridge cleanup in its campaign advertis-
ing against Schauer’s opponent.43  Energy policy and oil spills are hot 
political topics, but most On-Scene Coordinators are untrained in manag-
ing ambitious politicians trying to use the disaster and helicopter footage 
from it in their election campaigns. From a legal perspective, lawyers 
need to remind their clients that making materially false statements to a 
federal agency can be prosecuted as a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
44
 
And in a significant disaster, there is almost always enough federal in-
volvement that critical information about the scope and magnitude of a 
problem will be submitted to a federal agency with some jurisdiction 
 40. “Congressman Mark Schauer viewed the response area with US EPA and Michigan State 
Police in a Michigan State Police helicopter. The Congressman will attend the Public Meeting at 
1900 [hours].” Kalamazoo River/Enbridge Spill – Removal POLREP-SITREP, UNITED STATES 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 2.6, 
http://www.epa.gov/enbridgespill/pdfs/sitreps/20100802_sitrep8.pdf.   
 41. Governor Granholm tours area by helicopter and makes public statement afterwards that
Enbridge was not doing enough, Two days later, she made another such helicopter tour, commenting 
on cleanup progress. Michigan Grappling with Its Own Oil Spill, CBS NEWS (July 28, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michigan-grappling-with-its-own-oil-spill/; Michigan oil spill con-
tained: Enbridge, CBC NEWS (July 30, 2010), http://news.ca.msn.com/top-stories/cbc-
article.aspx?cp-documentid=25044809. 
  42 . “News events give candidates chance to get publicity during campaign season,” comment-
ed on Schauer’s prominent use of the Enbridge spill in campaign. Nathan Hurst, News events give 
candidates chance to get publicity during campaign season, THE DETROIT NEWS (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20100909/OPINION01/9090339. A search of YouTube showed 
at least seven local television news stories prominently featuring Congressman Schauer’s  statements 
about the Enbridge spill, stories between July 28 and September 15, 2010.  
http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=enbridge+michigan+oil+spill+television&qs=n&form=QBV 
R&pq=enbridge+michigan+oil+spill+television&sc=0-0&sp=-1&sk= 
 43. The Sierra Club ad on October 21, 2010 against Schauer’s opponent begins with helicopter 
aerial footage of the Enbridge cleanup, expressly noting the 800,000 gallon spill.  
http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=Mark+Schauer+Ads&Form=VQFRVP#view=detail&mid=30 
8F52A923B67838AA84308F52A923B67838AA84 
44. The making of materially false statements, even if unsworn, is sufficient for a person to be 
prosecuted under the statute. See, e.g., United States v. King, 660 F.3d 1071, 1081 (9th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4482 (June 11, 2012) (upholding conviction of an individual who 
made oral unsworn statements to state inspector denying injection of polluted water into subsurface 
aquifer). Section 1001 is one of the most versatile weapons in a prosecutor’s arsenal and allows a 
prosecutor to mount an easily understandable criminal case when the reprehensible conduct sought 
to be punished arises in a very complex regulatory or factual context. 
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over the problem.
45
 Lawyers need to remind those responsible for public 
statements, particularly on critical factual information, that individuals 
can and have been prosecuted for making misleading or false statements. 
False or self-serving information served up by a party generally 
does much more damage to a company’s reputation and relationship with 
the community and regulators than truthful information about a bad sit-
uation. This applies even to a severe oil spill, like the failure of a four-
million-gallon Ashland tank near Pittsburgh in January 1988 that caused 
a discharge to the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers, resulting in closed wa-
ter supplies for tens of thousands of people downstream.
46
 It is better to 
make embarrassing admissions or to say that a party does not yet know 
about the severity of a situation than to try to guess or minimize what is 
known. Ashland’s public relations response was counterintuitive; it in-
volved having key executives release accurate, unflattering information 
in the cities affected. However, it was effective, and it is reportedly now 
used as a case study in effective crisis communications at the Harvard 
Business School.
47
 
45. The false information does not need to be directly submitted by the defendant to the federal 
agency in order to sustain a felony conviction. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 65 (1984) 
(false security clearance information submitted to defense contractor). 
46. “On January 2, 1988, a 4,000,000-gallon-capacity oil storage tank at the Ashland Petrole-
um Company Floreffe Terminal near West Elizabeth, Pennsylvania, collapsed as it was being filled 
to capacity for the first time since its reconstruction,” a collapse resulting from a brittle fracture of 
the steel owing to a defect in the steel and extremely cold weather at the time of filing. John L. 
Gross, John H. Smith & Richard N. Wright, Ashland Tank-Collapse Investigation, 3 J. 
PERFORMANCE CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES 144, 144 (1989). Ashland was publicly praised by regula-
tors for its quick and forthright admission of fault and aggressive cleanup. According to one report 
by Allegheny county officials, “The vast majority of businesses in the survey gave a positive as-
sessment of both Ashland Oil Inc. and clean-up officials’ performance in response to the spill.”  
JEANETTE M. TRAUTH ET AL., ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE JANUARY 1988 
ASHLAND OIL TANK COLLAPSE IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSLYVANIA 6, 57–58 (1989), available 
at http://www.briem.com/files/UCSUR_ASHLAND_economicpolicyreport1989.pdf. In one after-
action paper, a Coast Guard officer stated Ashland Oil Corporation accepted full responsibility for 
cleanup operations and contracted for all phases of containment and cleanup. Its cooperative re-
sponse to guidance by federal officials monitoring the response contributed to the response’s overall 
effectiveness. Eugene A. Miklaucic & Jerry Saseen, The Ashland Oil Spill, Floreffe, PA—Case 
History and Response Evaluation, Oil Spill Conference, Feb. 1989, at 45, http://ioscproceedings.org/ 
doi/pdf/10.7901/2169-3358-1989-1-45. 
47. “Ashland Oil Co. Chairman John Hall’s admission that his company made mistakes in 
assembling the diesel fuel tank that burst last Saturday may make company attorneys wince, but his 
frankness is playing well in the public arena.” Honesty About Fuel Spill Scores High with Public, 
HERALD-LEADER, Jan. 8, 1988, at A1. “The Harvard Business School now uses Ashland’s response 
as a case study in effective crisis communications.” Cynthia Bent Findlay, Savvy Crisis Communica-
tions Plans Can Save Companies Headaches, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/print-edition/2011/04/22/savvy-crisis-communications-plans-
can.html?page=all. 
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PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT: VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT 
Some jurisdictions have looked at volunteer resources in advance 
and put forth programs to train non-professional responders.
48
 Many 
communities are served by well trained volunteer fire agencies and po-
lice auxiliaries. Going further, trained volunteers such as the Red Cross, 
Skywarn storm spotters, ham radio operators, and Community Emergen-
cy Response Teams (CERTs)
49
 found in California and elsewhere can be 
a ready resource of talent available for such tasks as damage assessment, 
communications, first aid, food preparation, child care, psychological 
support, and various administrative roles. 
However, many communities lack a mechanism to direct the re-
sources of “spontaneous volunteers”—those well-meaning individuals 
who show up and want to help.
50
 Unknown to them at the moment they 
present themselves, they are a liability, rather than an asset. Their skills 
and training are unknown, they are not familiar with the response struc-
ture, and they have the ability to quickly become victims themselves. A 
telling case study of the aftermath of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake 
revealed that the number of persons rescued from the debris (approxi-
mately 800) came at a cost of the lives of 100 responders who were 
killed in the course of their well intended actions. 
51
 Untrained respond-
ers are difficult to control and can easily expose themselves to structural 
collapses, hazardous materials, problems arising from utilities (power, 
gas, water, sewage), and they are seldom equipped with even the most 
basic protective gear.
52
 Still more problems can arise if their well intend-
ed efforts cause injury to others. In first responder training, as in most 
advanced first aid and rescue training, response trainees are repeatedly 
told, “Don’t make a second victim,” or “Never bring additional victims 
to the scene in the form of rescuers.”53 Cleanups after hurricanes and 
48. See Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Training, COUNTY L.A. FIRE DEP’T,
http://www.fire.lacounty.gov/lacofd-cert-program/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
49. Id. 
50. See Managing Spontaneous Volunteers in Times of Disaster: The Synergy of Structure and 
Good Intentions, FED. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/donations/ 
ManagingSpontaneousVolunteers.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
51. “This was the case following the Mexico City earthquake where untrained, spontaneous 
volunteers saved 800 people. However, 100 people lost their lives while attempting to save others. 
This is a high price to pay and is preventable through training.” CERT, SANTA BARBARA COUNTY 
FIRE DEP’T, http://www.sbcfire.com/cert/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
52. See Bryce Hall, Don’t Be a Dead Hero, SLATE (May 27, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articl 
es/health_and_science/science/2013/05/rescuers_turning_into_victims_lessons_from_first_responde 
rs_on_saving_people.html. 
53. Reinhardt’s experience at 1990’s First Responder training and Randle’s experience at April 
2010 Wilderness First Aid training. 
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other storms are intrinsically very dangerous, involving unstable struc-
tures, broken electrical and gas lines, and serious water hazards, often 
occurring at the same time and location.
54
 
A robust community preparedness program such as CERT can help 
channel some of these volunteers into productive roles. Other tactics dur-
ing an actual response may include a screening process to identify quali-
fications and ensure volunteers are working in tandem with already-
trained persons or professional responders. 
The lawyer’s role in handling individual or corporate volunteers is 
to help public agencies prepare to receive such help or to turn it away. 
Acceptance of volunteer help implies that the agency accepting it will 
adequately supervise them, warn them of hazards, and avoid placing 
them in situations that they are untrained in or ill equipped to handle. 
Otherwise, the agency that accepts them and handles them poorly may 
face liability claims by injured volunteers as well as by those who are 
killed or injured by untrained volunteers. Those agencies may also face 
liability claims for property destroyed by such volunteers because of the 
volunteer’s inexperience or lack of skill. 
By the same token, effective integration of volunteer resources, as 
well as donated equipment and materiel, can greatly improve disaster 
response. Such assistance provides faster relief and frees the most highly 
trained professionals to address the most difficult and dangerous tasks, 
while leaving routine but important staff or support work to willing (and 
properly trained) volunteers. 
INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY AND TRAINING: PASSING LESSONS ON 
Lessons Learned 
Each UO provides valuable lessons. Many of those hard-earned bits 
of knowledge are retained by professional response agencies. However, 
some “ground level” experiences sometimes fade from the institutional 
memory through disuse or perhaps through changes in personnel or polit-
ical leadership.
55
 
54. Fact Sheet, Clean up Safely After a Natural Disaster, CENTERS DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/cleanup/facts.asp (last updated Sept. 2, 2008). 
55. See L.A. Now Live: Santa Monica Offers L.A. a Cautionary Tale on Quakes, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-la-now-live-santa-monica-quakes-
20131115-dto,0,3568742.story#axzz2l40Z9dlK (referencing faded resolve to retrofit buildings vul-
nerable to earthquake damage following the 1994 Northridge Quake). 
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4831-1081-3209.1. 
A specific example rose from responses to hurricanes during the 
1990s. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, widespread power outages 
created a demand for ice. Considerable resources were expended to ac-
quire ice and to ship it in trailer loads to a widespread set of locations 
where its distribution caused near-riots to those anxious to get it. This 
caused a further demand for law enforcement personnel to ensure the 
orderly distribution of a very perishable commodity.
56
 
The post-emergency analysis came to recognize the futility of this 
response. After the power fails, most home refrigerators and freezers can 
maintain stored food for a period of two to three days. In that window, 
the food must be consumed or discarded. The delivery of ice to the pub-
lic after that period is good for nothing more than chilling beverages. 
FEMA training after that event warned against wasting valuable trans-
portation and law enforcement resources on moving ice into the impacted 
area for residential use.
57
 Consider the value of having loaded those 
trucks with non-perishable food (such as MREs), resulting in a far more 
meaningful response with a productive use of resources.
58
 
Fast-forward to a similar hurricane event following change in ad-
ministrations. The lessons were too quickly forgotten and once again, 
considerable resources were squandered on providing ice to communities 
with prolonged power outages, with the same result as the earlier experi-
ence. 
From a legal perspective, improving institutional memory is imper-
ative both for public agencies and for private parties. Failure to learn les-
sons from past disasters (and near misses) lays a foundation to change 
due care to negligence, and if lessons remain unlearned after repeated 
disasters and near misses, to gross negligence or misconduct. 
56. Co-author Reinhardt was present at a FEMA training session in the early 1990s, where this 
lesson was presented to trainees. 
57. Id. 
58. For illustrations of this repeated exercise, see Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Stumbling Storm-
Aid Effort Put Tons of Ice on Trips to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2005), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2005/10/02/national/nationalspecial/02ice.html?pagewanted=print; FEMA Says No to Ice for Hurri-
cane Survivors (ABC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id= 
5828158; Report: $15 million in ice wasted by state after Hurricane Isaac (WWL-TV New Orleans 
television broadcast Aug. 1, 2013), available at http://www.wwltv.com/news/New-Report-15-Million-in-Ice-
Wasted-By-State-After-Hurricane-Isaac—218034431.html; and Robert Sargent & Ramsey Camp-
bull, Freebie Ice Goes Like Hotcakes, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 30, 2007), http://articles.orlan 
dosentinel.com/2007-01-30/news/LFREEIC E30_1_ice-minneola-freeman (referencing ice distribu-
tion following Hurricane Andrew in 1992). The authors use the ice example as an illustration of lost 
institutional memories resulting in wasted valuable resources at a time when those assets are at a 
premium. 
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Lessons Implemented—Training, Testing, and Drills 
While no emergency ever follows a script, there is no substitute for 
training, especially training updated as a result of weaknesses discovered 
in prior drills or recent disasters. Unfortunately, training is too often re-
garded as a diversion from mainstream duties instead of being described 
as one of the standard duties of responders who may find themselves in a 
supporting role. 
Each UO presents new information that must be assimilated into the 
knowledge base (refer back to the lessons on ice distribution). Respond-
ers find themselves in ever-more specialized roles. The classic fire-
fighting organization of the early twentieth century has evolved into an 
agency also capable of providing medical aid, hazardous material re-
sponse, urban search and rescue, and more. 
Training can also help prevent responders from becoming victims. 
In a larger event such as a hurricane or an earthquake, responders may 
begin the response as victims; their transition into responders can be ac-
celerated through training such as home and family preparedness pro-
grams. In the aftermath of the 1994 Northridge Quake in California, a 
significant number of first responders could not report for duty as ex-
pected because they were dealing with domestic emergencies and fright-
ened family members.
59
 Planners need to account for this shrinkage in 
human resources and encourage practices and education to reduce that 
number. 
Emergency training, testing, and periodic drills are not just for first 
responders; they are critical steps to avoid loss and liability. Many envi-
ronmental laws include contingency planning and emergency response 
requirements. These may include requirements that are often written into 
discharge permits, hazardous waste handling requirements, spill preven-
tion, countermeasure and control plans, and even pre-treatment permits 
for discharge to a municipal sewer.
60
 The listing contained in section 
311(j)(5) of the Clean Water Act is typical and includes “training, 
equipment testing, [and] periodic unannounced drills,” all keyed to ad-
dressing the worst case discharge at the facility, including fire and explo-
sion, as well as adverse weather conditions.
61
 
The lawyer’s role is not only to help ensure that clients comply with 
such requirements, but that clients learn from and correct the deficiencies 
59. Reinhardt personal recollection from work on Northridge Quake.
60. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (SPCC requirements for oil and hazardous substances). 
61. Id.; See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 112.21 (2013) (facility response training and drills/exercises), 
Appendix D (worst case discharge planning). 
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identified in these rehearsals and incorporate the lessons into appropriate 
training and updated response plans. Particularly, because the lawyer’s 
evaluation can be conducted with the shield of the attorney–client privi-
lege, the attorney can play a trusted role in helping improve emergency 
response by helping the client distill the right lessons from practice so 
that in an actual emergency the losses are avoided or minimized. 
Planning for potential natural and man-made disasters is unavoida-
bly part of law practice in fields ranging from banking, to telecommuni-
cations, to education, to zoning. To serve their clients effectively in these 
fields, attorneys need to help their clients routinely plan and respond to 
such emergencies. The lawyer’s failure to do so places clients at consid-
erable risk when disasters strike. 
Experience with disaster responses and recoveries in the last decade 
suggest very strongly that lawyers who are effective in such work focus 
on ensuring that emergency communications work, and work well, so 
that their clients can protect their customers, employees, and their com-
munities, as well as their ongoing businesses. 
